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I.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued
for the first time exemptive orders permitting fully transparent actively
managed exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to list on national stock
exchanges, 1 with the first listing occurring on March 25, 2008. 2 Also in
March, the Commission issued proposed rule 6c-11 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act” or the “Act”),3 which would exempt
* J.D. 2007, Columbia University School of Law. The author is an Associate in the
Washington, D.C. office of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This Article reflects the views and
opinions of the author, which should not be imputed to any other person or entity. This
Article does not contain advice of any kind.
1. See, e.g., WisdomTree Trust et al., Order Under Sections 6(c), 12(d)(1)(J) and 17(b)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,174,
2008 SEC LEXIS 1360 (Feb. 27, 2008); see also WisdomTree Trust, et al., Notice of
Application, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,147, 73 Fed. Reg. 7776 (Feb. 6,
2008) [hereinafter WisdomTree Trust, Notice of Application].
2. The first actively managed bond ETF, the Bear Stearns Current Yield Fund (YYY)
was launched on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) on March 25, 2008. See Murray
Coleman, Bear Stearns Launches First Ever Active ETF, SEEKING ALPHA, March 25, 2008,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/69871-bear-stearns-launches-first-ever-active-etf. The fund
was liquidated in early October. See Scott Ebner, Bear Stearns Current Yield Fund (Ticker:
YYY) to be Liquidated, ETF Notice #08-040, American Stock Exchange, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://www.amex.com/amextrader/tdrInfo/data/axNotices/2008/etf08040.pdf.
Other
actively managed ETFs, including equity-based funds, continue to trade. See, e.g., NYSE
Euronext, Press Release, “PowerShares Lists its First Ever Actively-Managed ETFs on
NYSE Arca,” Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.nyse.com/press/1207739565764.html.
3. Comments on the Proposed Rules were due May 19, 2008. Exchange-Traded
Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 33-8901, 73 Fed. Reg. 53, at 14,618 (Mar. 18,
2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270 and 274) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rules].
While it is difficult to predict when the SEC is likely to implement the Proposed Rules,
some practitioners anticipate “that the likely implementation date for any final rules based
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transparent ETFs—those that track a published securities index or are
actively managed with disclosed portfolio holdings—from various
requirements of the Act. 4 After years of speculation about when the SEC
would approve the first actively managed ETFs, 5 the first structures
acceptable to regulators are more of the same, 6 with a twist. While the
newly-approved actively managed ETFs increase flexibility by permitting
portfolio holdings to detach from published indices, they nonetheless
remain fully transparent, much like their index-tracking predecessors. 7 As
the SEC notes, “an actively managed ETF would operate in the same
manner as an index-based ETF,” 8 with Intraday Value transmitted every
fifteen seconds. 9 Daily disclosure of portfolio holdings, a feature
emblematic of the traditional equity index structure, also characterizes the
new, actively managed ETFs approved by the SEC. 10
Still, while the first actively managed ETFs do not free innovators
from transparency requirements, the SEC nonetheless indicates that its
recent actions do not foreclose the possibility that future structures may
operate with less openness. In a comment that could easily encourage a
on the Proposed Rules would occur no earlier than the beginning of 2009.” Client
Advisory, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, SEC Proposes New Rules to Streamline ETF
Formation (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.kattenlaw.com (search “ETF”; then follow article
hyperlink).
4. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,618; see Exchange-Traded Funds, SEC
News Dig., Issue 2008-49 (Mar. 12, 2008), http://sec.gov/news/digest/2008/dig031208.htm
(explaining further how the proposed rule changes would impact Investment Company Act
exemptions applicable to ETFs).
5. See John Authers & Rebecca Knight, Active Solution is Within Reach, FIN. TIMES
USA, Jan. 30, 2007, at 1 (“It has been talked about for years, but 2007 might be the year that
the first actively managed exchange traded fund makes it to market.”); Diya Gullapalli,
Actively Traded ETFs: A Step Closer to Reality, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2008, at C3
(“Regulators appear to be on the verge of approving a highly anticipated new type of
exchange-traded fund.”); Chuck Jaffe, Next Generation of ETFs Will Reshape Fund
Business, THOMSON FIN. NEWS (Sept. 27, 2006) (Westlaw, Thomsonfin) (“Regulators who
have been winking at the new [ETFs] and allowing them to be ‘active’ but not ‘actively
managed’ are likely to cross that line in the near future. You can expect actively managed
ETFs by year’s end.”).
6. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,620 n.27 (“[E]ach of the actively managed
ETFs operating under the recent exemptive orders approved by the Commission is required
to make public each day the securities and other assets in its portfolio.”).
7. Id. at 14,623; see Stacy L. Fuller, The Evolution of Actively Managed ExchangeTraded Funds, REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Apr. 16, 2008, at 89 (“By the end of 2007,
several hundreds of ETFs had been organized—all of them, index-based.”).
8. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,623.
9. Id. at 14,625 n.95.
10. See Press Release, Foley & Lardner LLP, Foley & Lardner LLP Counsels First
Actively-Managed
Exchange
Traded
Fund
(Mar.
12,
2008),
http://www.foley.com/news/news_detail.aspx?newsid=3408 (discussing how the first
actively managed ETF, The Bear Stearns Current Yield Fund (YYY), would report its entire
underlying portfolio online each day).
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new round of speculation regarding the next era in the evolution of ETF
products, the SEC noted, “[b]y proposing [a rule to permit fully transparent
ETFs to register without securing individual exemptive orders] we are not,
however, suggesting that we will not consider applications for exemptive
orders for actively managed ETFs that do not satisfy the proposed rule’s
transparency requirements.” 11
Prior to recent approvals, the SEC had left actively managed ETFs
suspended in regulatory stasis pending the resolution of transparency
concerns. 12 As reflected in a 2001 concept release, the SEC hesitated to
approve actively managed structures because fund managers might
sacrifice transparency—“a hallmark of ETFs” 13 —for stronger market
performance. 14 Equity index ETFs had always published daily the
securities needed to acquire shares from funds, as well as the securities
tendered to investors when creation units were redeemed. 15 Andrew
Donohue, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management,
explained that the Commission feared fund managers would act to prevent
“too much transparency,” 16 a move perceived as dangerous, particularly in
a shifting market environment where increasing numbers of retail investors
are trading ETF shares. 17 In approving the first actively managed ETFs,
the SEC, rather than overcoming its concerns with transparency, simply
limited current approvals to transparent structures. As a result, while active
management represents a new evolution in the ETF industry, newlyapproved funds remain firmly anchored—at least for now—to the same
principles that underlie previous approvals of equity index ETFs.
This Article does not attempt to predict whether or when the SEC will
approve an actively managed ETF that does not conform to current
transparency requirements, but instead takes a backward glance at the
regulatory approval process, with the view that a look back may reveal
significant information about the future. As curious investment structures

11. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,623.
12. See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech
by SEC Staff: Remarks Before the 4th Annual Art of Indexing Summit (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch092006ajd.htm.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., 1 Reg. of Inv. Companies (MB) § 26.02[1][a] (2008) (describing
transparency in ETF formation and operation).
16. Donohue, supra note 12.
17. See, e.g., Rebecca Knight, Irresistible Rise of the Flexible Fund, FIN. TIMES USA,
Jan. 10, 2006, at 10 (reporting that two-thirds of a major U.S. bank’s ETF trades have come
from retail investors); see also Lawrence C. Strauss, New Frontier: ETFs Are Surging in
Popularity. Get Ready for Actively Managed Versions. (Exchange-Traded Funds),
BARRON’S, Jan. 3, 2005, at F5 (noting ETFs are popular with both retail and institutional
investors).
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that traverse the line between open-end 18 and closed-end 19 funds, ETFs
already have raised numerous regulatory headaches underscored by
unspoken normative judgments, some of which can be extracted from a
web of exemption letters and statutory language. If there is an element
common to ETF approvals, it is that all are based on a delicate regulatory
surgery performed under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 20
Rather than strike directly at the issue of active management, this
Article seeks to distill the underlying assumptions, goals, and regulatory
values that inform the history of exemptive relief under the Investment
Company Act for equity index ETFs and, now, actively managed,
transparent ETFs. The Article concludes that the common principles
behind various exemptions unite to support a general theory of how
regulators believe the ETF market should function. Transparency, at both
the index and the portfolio level, has been the cornerstone of exemptive
relief from various provisions of the Act, because it fosters an arbitrage
mechanism that protects retail investors by creating price effects that ripple
through the secondary market and push trading prices toward net asset
value (NAV). 21 Embedded within regulatory deference to the ETF
arbitrage system is the SEC’s implicit recognition that the natural
corrective abilities of a liquid and transparent market often protect
investors more effectively than regulatory mandates. This Article takes the
position that an arbitrage-driven price stability regime is the central reason
why index-tracking and transparent actively managed ETFs have received
exemptive relief from various constraints imposed by the Investment
Company Act. 22
18. The Investment Company Act defines an open-end company as “a management
company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is
the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000).
19. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (2000) (defining a closed-end investment
company under the Investment Company Act as simply “any management company other
than an open-end company”); see also SEC, Closed-End Funds, Answers Page,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclose.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2008) (explaining that
closed-end funds typically offer a fixed number of shares in an initial public offering and
later trade on secondary exchanges). Shares in closed-end funds usually are not redeemable,
such that closed-end funds are not subject to the same liquidity requirements as open-end
funds. Id.
20. As Stacy L. Fuller explains, exemptive relief from the Investment Company Act
requires that regulators deviate from the letter of the statute: “While the 1940 Act provides
clear and divergent regulatory regimes for open- and closed-end funds, it does not provide a
regime for open- and closed-end hybrids, such as ETFs. The SEC plays an important role in
filling that vacuum, by using its exemptive powers to create a regulatory regime for ETFs.”
Fuller, supra note 7, at 91.
21. See infra Part II.D (discussing transparency and the arbitrage system).
22. The proposition that arbitrage has informed exemptive relief for ETFs is not a
controversial one. In its Proposed Rules, the SEC requested comment on the following
question: “Does the requirement that an ETF establish creation unit sizes the number of
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If an efficient arbitrage mechanism is critical to investor protection,
and if arbitrageurs require transparency to perform their stabilizing
function, then what is to be said of non-transparent actively managed
ETFs? Some commentators focus on the risk of front-running,23 and how it
may raise concerns about openness by fund managers. 24 Depending on the
financial innovations underway to counteract this situation, actively
managed ETFs may indeed provide investors with less transparency than
the index-tracking variety. 25 Nonetheless, this Article does not predict
whether the SEC will eventually approve non-transparent actively managed
ETFs, but instead aims to shed light on why the SEC has approved the
existing class of transparent funds. By subjecting the evolution of SEC
approval of transparent ETFs to the harsh gaze of hindsight, this Article
intends to help clear a path for future structures by navigating the oftentangled maze of values that has produced the first two generations of ETF
products.
II.

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

A.

The Indexing Tradition

Despite the SEC’s recent approval of actively managed ETFs, most
existing ETFs remain passive 26 instruments that track an underlying
securities index, 27 such that the portfolio changes only in response to a

which is reasonably designed to facilitate arbitrage provide the sponsor or advisor of the
ETF with sufficient guidance in setting appropriate thresholds?” SEC Proposed Rules,
supra note 3, at 14,627. This Article seeks to advance the discussion of the role arbitrage
plays in the regulation of ETFs, by exploring the nuances and specific justifications behind
its importance in the regulatory setting.
23. See Thao Hua, Bear Stearns Could Land 1st Active ETF on U.S. Shores, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, Apr. 30, 2007 (noting that transparency is one of the biggest challenges
facing actively managed ETFs, because managers must fully disclose the underlying
portfolio and run the risk that other managers may front-run their strategies); Raquel
Pichardo, Solving Puzzle of Active ETFs, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 1, 2007
(explaining that transparency is the most daunting regulatory hurdle facing fund managers
who are trying to launch the next wave of ETFs, because “[m]anagers worry that full
transparency of their trades will betray their investment processes and open the door to
front-runners”).
24. Pichardo, supra note 23.
25. See sources cited in supra note 23 (discussing risks of transparency to fund
managers).
26. Here, “passive” indicates a lack of active trading by fund managers.
27. See e.g., SEC, Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2008) (noting, in 2007, that “all ETFs seek to achieve the same return
as a particular market indexes [sic]”).
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change in the index. 28 Equity index ETFs “closely mirror” their underlying
indices, making portfolio turnover rare. 29 Traditional securities indices 30
typically include equities based on capitalization weighting, 31 which is
partially explained by the relationship between high capitalization and
liquidity. 32 Early ETFs strove to replicate the performance of traditional
stock indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500
Index. 33
Before actively managed structures emerged, the ETF industry began
to develop new indices for the purpose of launching equity index ETFs. 34
Fueled by the growing popularity of ETFs as investment vehicles, sectorspecific and fund-specific indices have produced increasingly narrow
benchmarks. 35 The demand for increasingly diverse offerings has created a
situation where “more indices are being developed to form the basis of new
ETFs,” 36 marking a change from the time when ETFs were built around
then-existing, traditional indices. 37 While “fund-friendly” indices may use
the same capitalization method of traditional benchmark indices, they differ
28. See Anthony Ragozino & Charlie J. Gambino, Actively-Managed Exchange Traded
Funds: Coming Soon to a Market Near You? 8 INVESTMENT LAWYER 3 (2001) (explaining
that an ETF is designed to track a particular stock index, such that the ETF’s portfolio
changes only if the benchmark index changes).
29. Vipul K. Bansal & Archana Somani, Exchange Traded Funds: Challenge to
Traditional Mutual Funds, REV. OF BUS., Fall 2002, at 41.
30. Indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the S&P 500 Index, and the
NASDAQ Composite Index were not “originally created with the idea that a fund portfolio
replicating the structures and rules of the index would be a popular investment. These
indexes were developed to serve as market indicators and/or as a standard for comparison
with actual portfolios managed by active portfolio managers.” GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS MANUAL 131 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002).
31. See, e.g., id. at 131 (noting that, with the exception of the original Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the Nikkei Average, most popular indices are capitalization
weighted).
32. See id. at 132 (correlating market capitalization and liquidity).
33. See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, Why Hot Funds are Tripping Up Some Investors–ETFs,
Which are Meant to Track Benchmarks, Increasingly Go Astray, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2007, at A1 (explaining that ETFs “were designed to match the performances of various
market benchmarks, such as the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index”).
34. See GASTINAEU, supra note 30, at 132-33 (discussing reasons for the development
of new indices that depart from the capitalization weighted approach); see also SEC
Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,619 (explaining that many newer ETFs are based on
more specialized indices, including some designed specifically for a particular ETF).
35. Exchange Traded Funds Growing in Popularity, INVESTMENT ADVISER, June 4,
2007, http://www.ftadviser.com (search “Exchange Traded Funds Growing in Popularity”;
then follow article hyperlink).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Authers & Knight, supra note 5, at 11 (observing that while ETFs
traditionally were based on conventional indices and weighted by market capitalization,
ETF providers recently have launched funds that incorporate alternative weighting
strategies).
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by considering “the structural requirements of funds, the economics of
trading, the investment objectives of funds, and the presence of other
investors in the marketplace.” 38
Others use alternative weighting
methodologies 39 that depart from capitalization weighting to incorporate
factors such as cash flow, dividends, sales, and book value. 40 Sampling
strategies, in which ETFs track a limited array of securities from a given
index based on a wide array of selection strategies, are also common. 41 For
example, the benchmark index might be limited to securities that come out
favorably in a dividend weighting evaluation. 42 These new indices
“convert an established stock selection process into an index which serves
as the template for a portfolio.” 43 Unsurprisingly, given the demand for
increasingly specialized sector exposure, recently-developed indices have
led to ETFs “of virtually every flavor,” 44 including those that track private
equity, gold, vaccines, intellectual property, nanotechnology, and
renewable energy. 45 Demand for greater sector exposure has also led to
commodities ETFs that, unlike mutual funds that hold equity in publiclytraded commodities companies, attempt to track the prices of the
underlying commodities themselves, typically through direct ownership or
futures contracts. 46

38. GASTINAEU, supra note 30, at 132.
39. Authers & Knight, supra note 5, at 11.
40. ETFs Growing in Popularity, supra note 35; see also Rob Carrick, The Case for
Blending Passive, Active Indexing, GLOBE & MAIL UPDATE, May 19, 2007 (describing the
new paradigm of fundamental indexing as a refinement of traditional indexing).
41. See Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Regulatory
Issues Involving Exchange Traded Funds at the American Stock Exchange Symposium on
Exchange Traded Funds, (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch534.htm
(explaining that “rather than holding securities that replicate an entire index, [an ETF] could
instead use ‘sampling techniques’ to track the performance of an index . . . . By ‘sampling’
the stocks in an index, the exchange traded fund can seek to replicate the performance of the
index without actually owning all the component stocks in the index.”).
42. See, e.g., Rob Garver, The ETF Evolution, BANK INV. CONSULTANT, Mar. 2007, at
25 (citing ETFs issued by WisdomTree Investments as an example).
43. GASTINAEU, supra note 30, at 165.
44. Chuck Jaffe, ETFs v. Mutual Funds: Winner Depends on You, THOMSON FIN.
NEWS, July 30, 2006.
45. Revolution or Pollution? Exchange-Traded Funds, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2007, at
83-84; see David E. Stout & Huaiyu Chen, A Primer on Exchange Traded Funds: Purpose,
Operation, and Risk, THE CPA J., Sept. 2006, at 56 (commenting that the list of ETFs is
comprehensive enough that today’s investors “can use ETFs to cover all the sectors, styles,
and market capitalization options associated with ordinary mutual fund investments”).
46. See, e.g., Philip McBride Johnson, The CFTC and Commodity-Based ExchangeTraded Funds, 11 DERIVATIVES USE, TRADING & REG. 303, 304 (2006) (noting that ETFs
commonly are tied in value to the price of gold or other commodities trading on a futures
exchange); see also Robert S. Bernstein, Oil, Currency, and Silver Commodities Come to
the Securities Market, 33(4) CORP. TAXATION 40 (2006) (noting the emergence of
commodity-based ETFs).
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Actively Managed, Transparent ETFs

The new structures that the SEC approved in early 2008 differ from
their predecessors in that fund managers are no longer bound by the
confines of a particular securities index. Nevertheless, all actively
managed ETFs approved by the SEC must disclose their portfolio holdings
daily, just like the traditional index-tracking variety that preceded them. 47
The commonality between the first actively managed ETFs and traditional
equity index ETFs is that both are “fully transparent.” 48 The first
generation of actively managed ETFs provides disclosure in largely the
same manner as index-tracking funds 49 with the main difference
concerning an enhanced freedom to select and trade portfolio securities.
While ETF fund managers are no longer confined to a particular index, the
SEC nonetheless limits its approval “to transparent actively managed
ETFs,” 50 which must fully disclose their holdings. 51 All existing ETFs may
therefore be characterized as transparent.
C.

Creation and Redemption

In most cases, an authorized participant 52 creates an ETF by
depositing a block of securities, called a portfolio deposit, 53 with a
custodian in exchange for shares of equivalent value. 54 The authorized
participant receives from the ETF sponsor a block of shares called a

47. See WisdomTree Trust, Notice of Application, supra note 1, at 7780 (“On each
Business Day, before the commencement of trading in Shares on the Fund’s listing
Exchange, the Fund will disclose on its Web site the identities and quantities of the money
market securities and other assets held by the Fund that will form the basis for the Fund’s
calculation of NAV at the end of the Business Day.”).
48. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,623.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 14,642.
51. As the SEC explains, “[a]n ETF that chooses not to disclose its portfolio would
have to track an index whose provider discloses the identities and weightings of the
securities and other assets that constitute the index in order to rely on the proposed rule.”
Id. at 14,642-43.
52. Authorized participants are institutional investors that create ETFs by acquiring the
necessary portfolio securities. See, e.g., CHRISTINE BRENTANI, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT IN
PRACTICE 167 (Elsevier Ltd. 2001) (2004) (explaining that, when demand for an ETF is
expected, a large intermediary broker/dealer or authorized participant buys securities
representing an underlying index).
53. Portfolio deposits “essentially need to match the index underlying the fund and be
acceptable to the fund’s adviser.” Reg. of Inv. Companies, supra note 15, § 26.02[1][a].
54. See Bansal & Somani, supra note 29, at 40 (discussing ETF formation); Phyllis J.
Bernstein, A Primer on Exchange-Traded Funds, J. ACCT., Jan. 1, 2002, at 39-40
(discussing the ETF share-creation process).
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creation unit, which typically contains 50,000 or more shares of the ETF. 55
Because the value of a creation unit will equal that of its corresponding
ETF shares, 56 portfolio deposits may include a small amount of cash to
balance differences between the value of the deposit and the shares’
NAV. 57 Investors also may acquire creation units on the secondary market
by purchasing a sufficient number of shares. 58 As a result, ETFs operate in
two markets; creations and redemptions define the primary market, while
investors who trade shares on an exchange create the secondary market. 59
ETF shares are redeemed through “in kind” transfers, which exchange
creation units for their underlying portfolio securities. 60 ETF shares are not
redeemable individually, 61 a feature that distinguishes them from most
open-end funds. 62 Redemptions are priced by the end-of-day NAV and
thus protect shares from dilution. 63 In-kind redemption also shelters ETF
shareholders from the tax consequences of cash-redeemable mutual
funds, 64 as in-kind redemption uses a direct securities transfer rather than a
55. Stuart M. Strauss, Exchange Traded Funds—the Wave of the Future? 7
INVESTMENT LAWYER 1, 15 (2000).
56. Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Act Release No. IC-25258,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,614, 57,616 (Nov. 8, 2001).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 54, at 39 (noting that broker-dealers often break up
creation units and offer ETF shares on the exchanges where individual investors can buy
them).
59. See Ragozino & Gambino, supra note 28, at 3 (explaining that there are really “two
markets” for ETFs); see also DOUGLAS S. ROGERS, TAX AWARE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
106 (Bloomberg Press 2006) (listing the two types of markets for ETFs as a primary market
of authorized participants and a secondary market of individual investors); Ira P. Shapiro,
An Introduction to U.S. ETFs, in PRACTISING LAW INST., NUTS & BOLTS OF FIN. PRODUCTS
2008 357, 361 (2008) (stating that most investors buy and sell ETF shares on the exchange,
instead of making direct purchases and redemptions from the fund itself as they would do
with index mutual funds); Letter from Philippe El-Asmar, Managing Dir., Barclays Capital
Inc., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (May 8, 2008) (on file with
author), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-08/s70708-4.pdf (noting transactions with
ETFs are limited to Authorized Participants, whereas “retail investors purchase and sell ETF
shares in secondary market transactions”).
60. BRENTANI, supra note 52, at 167.
61. See, e.g., Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,621 (“Because ETF shares
are not individually redeemable, an ETF requests relief to permit the ETF to register and
operate as an open-end fund and to issue shares that are redeemable in Creation Units
only.”).
62. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000) (indicating that openend funds traditionally redeem all shares).
63. American
Stock
Exchange
LLC,
Explanation
of
ETFs,
http://www.amex.com/?href=/etf/eductn/etf_edu_instit.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
64. The following is a summary of the two primary tax advantages of ETFs over mutual
funds:
First, because retail investors go directly to the market to obtain cash for their
shares, the fund manager does not have to sell shares that would trigger capital-
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sale yielding taxable gains. 65 Capital gains taxes are deferred until
investors sell the securities, 66 which in turn controls costs for the remaining
shareholders 67 and supports the claim that in-kind creation and redemption
provide for “relatively frictionless portfolio turnover.” 68

D.

The Arbitrage Mechanism

ETF shares trading on secondary exchanges can experience deviations
between share price and the NAV of their underlying portfolio securities. 69
While ETF share prices track the NAV of the fund’s portfolio securities, 70
short-term differences between the two prices nonetheless occur. 71 The
trading environment causes this deviation, marking a critical difference
between an ETF and an open-end mutual fund. The share price of an openend mutual fund “always equals its NAV,” 72 which, coupled with the
gain distributions for the remaining shareholders. Second, creation unit holders
can redeem their shares for the underlying stock rather than cash, thus deferring
the gain or loss until the distributed shares are sold by the investor.
See, e.g., Randy Gardner & Julie A. Welch, Increasing After-Tax Returns with Exchange
Traded Funds, J. FIN. PLANNING, June 2005, at 31, available at
http://www.fpanet.org/journal/articles/2005_Issues/jfp0605-art4.cfm.
65. See Kathleen Moriarty, Exchange-Traded Funds: Legal and Structural Issues
Worldwide, 29 INT’L BUS. L. 346, 349 (2001) (“[T]he ETF satisfies redemptions by
providing the redeeming party with the actual basket of designated stocks, rather than cash
proceeds resulting from the sale of such stocks . . . .”); see also Svea Herbst-Bayliss,
Fidelity Opens Magellan Fund to New Investors, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSN1441753420080114 (reporting that
Fidelity re-opened its Magellan mutual fund to new investors following increasing
withdrawals by retirees, which frequently forced the fund manager “to sell stocks he liked in
order to have enough cash on hand to meet redemptions”).
66. See Gardner & Welch, supra note 64, at 31 (citing this as a tax advantage); see also
Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57 (explaining in regard to the in-kind redemption process:
“According to the IRS, this exchange of essentially identical items does not trigger capital
gains. Thus, ETF shares allow an investor to delay payment of capital gains tax until the
final sale of the ETF shares.”).
67. See Gardner & Welch, supra note 64 (contrasting the relatively high capital gains
taxes associated with regular mutual funds with those associated with ETFs).
68. Moriarty, supra note 65, at 348.
69. Plante Moran Fin. Advisors, Exchange-Traded Funds Revisited 1 (2006),
http://www.plantemoran.com (search “Exchange-Traded Funds Revisited”; then follow “full
article” hyperlink).
70. Stuart Strauss & Scott M. Zoltowski, Exchange Traded Funds, in A.L.I.-A.B.A.,
INVESTMENT MGMT. REG. 67, 70 (Aug. 2006).
71. See John Demaine, Exchange Traded Funds for the Sophisticated Investor, 7
DERIVATIVES USE, TRADING & REG. 354, 355 (2002) (“While both ETFs and futures tend to
track underlying cash indices tightly over a period of time, in the short term they can trade
significantly away from ‘fair value.’”).
72. Plante Moran Fin. Advisors, supra note 69, at 1.
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absence of intraday trading, precludes a significant arbitrage opportunity
available to ETF investors. 73
In practice, arbitrage profits are constrained by the market responses
they create; high awareness of premiums and discounts motivates quick
transactions that remove the spread between NAV and share price, 74 and
provides ammunition to those who claim that “arbitrage is always a case of
diminishing returns.” 75 Nevertheless, arguments that arbitrage profits
quickly evaporate tend to support the notion that arbitrage opportunities
“discipline” 76 ETF share prices and prevent them from trading “at a
material discount or premium in relation to their NAV.” 77 For instance, if
the ETF share price rises above the NAV of the securities in the portfolio
basket, arbitrageurs have an incentive to quickly tender the necessary
securities to purchase a creation unit, which can then be broken up and sold
as individual ETF shares on an exchange. 78 Alternatively, if the NAV of
the portfolio basket exceeds the share price, arbitrageurs will redeem
creation units and sell the underlying portfolio securities. 79 As a result, if
the share price trades at a premium, arbitrageurs may quickly purchase
creation units and flood the secondary market with shares, which drives the
share price down toward conformity with NAV. 80 A similar result may
occur if ETF shares trade at a discount, as the incentive to purchase and
redeem shares for the higher-value portfolio securities will reduce share
supply and drive the price upward. 81 The resulting stability provided to
ETF markets is significant, as “the close correspondence between NAVs
and market prices of U.S. ETFs appears to be due largely to the feature of
in-kind purchases and redemptions, which historically has facilitated price73. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 1 (explaining investment opportunities available with
ETFs that are not available with mutual funds).
74. See Bansal & Somani, supra note 29, at 41 (“Investors can redeem ETF shares for
shares of the underlying portfolio, and vice versa. This enables large investors to take
advantage of any disparity between the market price and the underlying Net Asset Value
(NAV), which in turn keeps the two trading close to one another.”).
75. Daniel P. Collins, Shrinking World Opens Arbitrage Window, FUTURES, Dec. 2001,
at 66.
76. Bernstein, supra note 54, at 39.
77. Id.
78. See James M. Poterba & John B. Shoven, Exchange-Traded Funds: A New
Investment Option for Taxable Investors, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 423 (2002) (“If the ETF
share price rises too far above the NAV for the underlying assets, the creating institutions
will buy the associated securities, deposit them in the trust, and create new ETF shares.”).
79. See id. (“If the ETF share price falls below the NAV of the underlying assets,
institutions will purchase ETF shares and redeem them for the underlying securities.”).
80. See Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,616 (“As the supply of individual
ETF shares available in the secondary market increases, the price of the ETF shares may fall
to levels closer to NAV.”).
81. See id. (“In purchasing the ETF shares, arbitrageurs create greater market demand
for the shares, which may raise the market price to a level closer to NAV.”).
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correcting arbitrage activity.” 82
While some question the profit potential of arbitrage, 83 such
challenges often validate the efficiency and speed of the arbitrage system in
the ETF context. 84 Arbitrage profits for particular institutional investors
may be thin, because the system works efficiently to respond quickly to
profit opportunities created by premiums and discounts. Gary L. Gastineau
and others argue that “[r]eal arbitrage opportunities, where the arbitrageur
covers his costs and earns a trading profit are not common.” 85
Nevertheless, the fact that U.S. domestic ETFs “are priced very close to
their true NAVs with only brief excursions any significant distance away” 86
supports the view that arbitrage quickly stabilizes and adds liquidity 87 to
the ETF market. In other words, market stability does not indicate that
short-term profit opportunities for arbitrageurs are lacking per se, 88 but that
they simply may be reaped too quickly to create significant wealth
opportunities for a given arbitrageur. 89
Indeed, short-term profit
opportunities, and the fierce competition to exploit them, explain why
arbitrage has succeeded at stabilizing U.S. ETF markets. A fleeting profit
opportunity motivates quick transactions that prevent premiums and
discounts from lingering or growing.
Profit aside, arbitrage is possible only because investors know
precisely what they are transacting in when they trade ETF shares and
acquire or redeem creation units. For most ETFs, indexing provides the
82. Kathleen H. Moriarty, Outline of Legal and Structural Issues Pertaining to Issuing
and Trading Exchange Traded Funds, in PRACTISING LAW INST., THE INVESTMENT MGMT.
INST. 2002: A SEMINAR FOR ’40 ACT LAWYERS 7, 30 (2002).
83. See, e.g., GASTINEAU, supra note 30, at 237 (arguing that arbitrage opportunities in
ETFs are rare).
84. For a discussion of how the spread of information and ease of trading increases
competition and thus makes arbitrage profits more difficult to achieve, see Collins, supra
note 75, at 66–68.
85. GASTINEAU, supra note 30, at 237.
86. Robert Engle & Debojyoti Sarkar, Premiums-Discounts and Exchange Traded
Funds, J. DERIVATIVES, Summer 2006, at 27, 41.
87. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 363:
By engaging in such arbitrage transactions throughout the trading day whenever
an ETF’s share price varies significantly from the value of its underlying
holdings, the Authorized Participants quickly provide “liquidity” whenever
there is an imbalance of buy or sell orders for ETF shares that would otherwise
cause the shares to trade at a premium or discount. By supplying such liquidity,
the Authorized Participants close the premium or discount and ensure that the
exchange price generally tracks the value of the ETF’s holdings closely, which
benefits all investors.
88. See Demaine, supra note 71, at 355 (noting that ETFs can trade significantly away
from “fair value” in the very short-term).
89. See generally Collins, supra note 75 (discussing diminishing returns of arbitrage
opportunities).
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first layer of transparency by publishing the benchmark that an ETF seeks
to track. 90 A fund’s redemption baskets may change in response to index
modifications, but these changes are published at the beginning of the day,
usually through the National Securities Clearing Corporation, 91 and
“generally reflect the contents of the portfolio of the ETF on that day and
do not change during the day.” 92 Changes to the underlying indices that
equity index ETFs track are infrequent and therefore conducive to
transparency and stability. 93 In addition, “the listing exchange makes
available the current value of the Portfolio Deposit on a per ETF share
basis at 15 second intervals throughout the day and disseminates intra-day
values of the relevant index.” 94 Sponsors of the first actively managed
ETFs have worked within this framework of transparency and argue that
“fully transparent portfolios, liquid portfolio securities and dissemination of
the ETF’s intraday indicative value permits arbitrage opportunities for
actively managed ETFs to the same extent as index-based ETFs . . . .” 95
Indeed, “[i]dentifying specific securities held in an ETF is much easier
than determining the holdings of mutual funds,” which “often delay or
provide outdated information about holdings periodically throughout the
year,” 96 much in contrast to fully transparent 97 ETFs that provide updated
portfolio holdings daily. 98 The SEC lauds ETFs’ frequent portfolio
disclosures for their “high degree of transparency,” 99 which provides
arbitrageurs with the necessary information for informed transactions. 100
The ability to determine the securities held in an ETF’s portfolio 101 has
90. See, e.g., Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,619 n.36 (“Because an
index-based ETF seeks to track the performance of an index, often by replicating the
component securities of the index, the ETF investment advisor or sponsor has no
reservations about informing the marketplace of the contents of the ETF’s portfolio.”).
91. See, e.g., Gary L. Gastineau, The Benchmark Index ETF Performance Problem, J.
OF PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 2004, at 96, 99 (noting that ETFs post their baskets to the
NSCC).
92. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,619.
93. Bernstein, supra note 54, at 39; see Bansal & Somani, supra note 29, at 41 (noting
general stability of index-linked ETFs); Gastineau, supra note 91, at 100 (discussing the
infrequent changes to an ETF’s underlying index).
94. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,619.
95. Ropes & Gray, SEC Issues Notices for Actively Managed ETFs 1 (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://www.ropesgray.com/secactivelymanagedetfs.
96. Plante Moran Fin. Advisors, supra note 69, at 3.
97. See Anne Papmehl, Exchange-Traded Funds: Something for Everyone, CMA
MGMT., Oct. 2001, at 48 (explaining that intraday transmittal of valuation and related
information makes ETFs fully transparent).
98. Fuller, supra note 7, at 90 (“ETFs disclose to the market the entire contents of their
portfolio every single day, including on their websites.”).
99. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,619.
100. Id.
101. See Letter from Ira P. Shapiro, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Barclays Global Fund
Advisors, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (May 16, 2008) (on file with
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been central to arbitrage transactions, as the ability of arbitrageurs and
others “to maintain [an ETF] price that tracks NAV is directly related to the
transparency of the fund’s portfolio.” 102 When institutional investors know
the contents of an ETF’s portfolio, they “can determine at any time on any
trading day the approximate NAV of an ETF” 103 and then compare that
figure to the market price to facilitate an arbitrage transaction where
imbalance exists. 104 Simply, “[f]or it all to work, big investors must be able
to calculate the value of the underlying stocks” that an ETF holds. 105
III. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
A.

Fund Types

The Investment Company Act provides for two primary ETF
structures: unit investment trusts (UITs) 106 and open-end investment
companies. 107 Shares in a UIT 108 represent an undivided interest in a fixed
basket of unmanaged securities. 109 These fixed portfolios are controlled
author), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-08/s70708-14.pdf (“Portfolio transparency is a
means for permitting professional trading firms to readily ascertain the value of an ETF’s
portfolio relative to its current secondary market price . . . .”).
102. Letter from Amy B.R. Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with author),
http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/02_sec_etfs_com.html.
103. Fuller, supra note 7, at 90.
104. Id.
105. John Waggoner, New Breed of ETFs Offer a Half-Hidden Manager, USA TODAY,
Mar. 31, 2007, at 3B.
106. The Investment Company Act defines a unit investment trust as follows:
[A]n investment company which (A) is organized under a trust indenture,
contract of custodianship or agency, or similar instrument, (B) does not have a
board of directors, and (C) issues only redeemable securities, each of which
represents an undivided interest in a unit of specified securities; but does not
include a voting trust.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (2000).
107. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 82, at 13 (“Currently, all U.S. ETFs are structured
either as UITs or open-end funds that invest in a portfolio of equity securities designed to
provide returns generally corresponding to the performance and dividend yield of a specific
stock index.”); see also Letter from Rita Dew, President, Nat’l Compliance Serv., to
Douglas J. Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n
(Mar.
10,
2005)
(on
file
with
author),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/ncs113005.htm (noting most ETFs are
registered as open-end companies).
108. See SEC, Unit Investment Trusts (UITs), http://www.sec.gov/answers/uit.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2008) (explaining that UITs usually offer a limited number of shares
through a one-time public offering).
109. Consider the following description of the UIT structure:
Typically the holder of a share in [a unit investment trust] has merely an
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“with little or no change” 110 for the duration of the investment. 111 The vast
majority of equity index ETFs and all actively managed ETFs use the openend investment company structure. 112 Actively managed ETFs cannot use
the UIT structure, which does not provide for active portfolio trading. 113
Sampling techniques, which ETFs registered as open-end companies often
use, are unavailable to the UIT structure. 114
Open-end investment companies, such as mutual funds, continually
issue shares redeemable at NAV. 115 Unlike non-redeemable closed-end
funds, 116 investors typically do not trade shares of open-end companies on
an exchange, 117 but purchase them from an issuer or broker at NAV. 118
Although ETFs are often structured as open-end investment companies, 119
they are distinct from traditional open-end funds; ETFs limit redemption 120
undivided interest in a package of specified securities that are held by a trustee
or custodian. There is no board of directors, and management discretion in the
management of the portfolio is entirely eliminated or reduced to a minimum.
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 48 (Aspen
Publishers 5th ed. 2004).
110. SEC, Unit Investment Trusts, supra note 108.
111. Id.
112. See Letter from James E. Ross, Senior Managing Dir., State St. Global Advisors, to
Nancy Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (May 19, 2008) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-08/s70708-7.pdf (noting ETF sponsors prefer the
open-end fund structure).
113. See SEC, Unit Investment Trusts (UITs), supra note 108.
114. Peter A. Ambrosini, Exchange Traded Funds, in A.L.I.-A.B.A., INVESTMENT
COMPANY REG. & COMPLIANCE 427, 429 (2002).
115. Nora M. Jordan, United States Regulation of Funds, in PRACTISING LAW INST.,
INT’L SEC. MARKETS 2004 BEST PRACTICES & CHANGING REQUIREMENTS IN GLOBAL
MARKETS 633, 636 (2004); see Letter from Dixie L. Johnson, Chair, Comm. on Fed.
Regulation of Secs., & John T. Bostelman, Chair, Subcomm. on Secs. Registration, Am.
Bar. Ass’n, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 81 (Feb. 11, 2005) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73804/dljohnson021105.pdf (providing more detail on
open-end investment companies’ operation and regulation).
116. Closed-end funds do not redeem shares, such that investors must rely on secondary
market trading to liquidate holdings. See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 109, at 49
(“Closed-end companies do not have redeemable securities; they may occasionally offer
new securities to the public as any industrial company does, but the usual way to acquire
shares is on the open market.”).
117. See, e.g., SEC Div. of Investment Mgmt., Protecting Investors: A Half Century of
Investment
Company
Regulation
423
(May
1992),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf
[hereinafter
SEC
Protecting Investors] (explaining differences between open-end and closed-end investment
companies).
118. SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2008);
SEC,
Invest
Wisely:
An
Introduction
to
Mutual
Funds,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited October 26, 2008).
119. Letter from Rita Dew to Douglas J. Scheidt, supra note 107.
120. ETF shares may only be redeemed in creation unit aggregations. Exchange-Traded
Funds, supra note 56.

110

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

and list shares for intraday trading, 121 which are features usually associated
with closed-end funds. 122 As Gastineau explains, ETFs “are a unique
hybrid of closed-end and open-end investment companies,” as they “trade
like common stocks or closed-end funds” 123 but can also be “redeemed like
open-end funds,” albeit only in large aggregations of shares. 124
B.

Specific Regulatory Provisions

As instruments that blend elements of open-end and closed-end
structures, ETFs traditionally require exemptive relief from various
provisions of the securities laws before they may operate. 125 In addition to
relief from the Investment Company Act, all ETFs must seek exemptions
from certain provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act (although this Article does not focus on these statutes). Exemptive
relief is available under § 28 of the Securities Act where it “is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of
investors.” 126 Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act provides a power
of limited exemptive authority, consistent with the parameters for relief
under the Securities Act. 127
121. See id. (discussing sales of ETF shares).
122. See Mutual Funds, supra note 118 (describing how ETFs differ from open-end
investment companies like mutual funds).
123. Gary L. Gastineau, Is Selling ETFs Short a Financial “Extreme Sport”? in FRANK
J. FABOZZI, SHORT SELLING 37, 38 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2004).
124. Id.; see EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKET 12-13 (Aspen Publishers 8th ed. 2005) (“ETFs are a
hybrid of open-end and closed-end funds—they are traded on the secondary market (mostly
on the AMEX) like shares of stock and their shares are redeemable, although only in very
large blocks, which provides certain efficiencies in the operation of the funds.”).
125. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 82, at 43 (“[T]he hybrid nature of ETFs does not fit
neatly into the existing U.S. regulatory regime. A variety of exemptions, interpretive and
no-action relief is required to accommodate the structure and trading features of ETFs . . .
.”); see also Shapiro, supra note 59, at 366:
Because ETFs are a hybrid between mutual funds and closed-end funds that
developed after the adoption of the 1940 Act, they are not directly authorized by
the statute and, under existing SEC positions, must be granted an exemption by
the SEC from complying with certain technical sections of the statute that do
not otherwise diminish the need to comply with the investor protections of the
statute.
The SEC has proposed relieving transparent ETFs from the need to acquire individual
exemptions. See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,618 (“The [proposed] rule would
permit certain ETFs to begin operating without the expense and delay of obtaining an
exemptive order from the Commission.”).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000).
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2000) (“[T]he Commission [may provide exemptive relief]
. . . to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is
consistent with the protection of investors.”).
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This Article focuses on relief from certain provisions of the
Investment Company Act that support a general theory of regulation in the
ETF market.
Pending the SEC’s proposal to streamline ETF
registrations, 128 ETFs must seek individual exemptive relief from
Investment Company Act §§ 2(a)(32) 129 and 5(a)(1) 130 , to permit ETFs to
register as open-end investment companies while limiting redemption to
creation units. 131 Relief from § 22(d) 132 and rule 22c-1 133 is similarly
necessary to allow secondary market trading in ETF shares at negotiated
prices that may not conform to NAV. 134 Furthermore, the SEC generously
has granted orders for exemptive relief from § 17(a), 135 thus permitting
“affiliates” to acquire and redeem creation units in-kind. 136 As a condition
for exemptive relief, ETFs may not market themselves as mutual funds and
must disclose that shares are not individually redeemable. 137 Actively
managed ETFs must disclose their status. 138
Until very recently, the SEC granted exemptive relief only to ETFs
that were “structured primarily to track various domestic or foreign
indices.” 139 The SEC’s recent proposed rule 6c-11 would exempt indextracking and fully transparent actively managed ETFs from the need to

128. See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,618 (stating that the SEC designed the
rule “to eliminate unnecessary regulatory burdens”).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2000).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000).
131. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,620-21.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (2000).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2005).
134. Id.; see also Strauss, supra note 55, at 17 (explaining that compliance with § 22(d)
and rule 22c-1 does not affect transactions in ETF shares, and thus makes applications for
exemptions necessary).
135. Aside from the general provision for exemptive relief in § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a6(c) (2000), § 17(b) permits the SEC to issue an order granting relief from § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (2000), provided three criteria are met: (1) the terms of the proposed
transaction are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching by anyone involved; (2)
the terms are consistent with the policy of each registered investment company involved;
and (3) the proposed transaction is consistent with general purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-17(b) (2000).
136. See Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,621-22 (addressing ETF
exemptions); see also Strauss, supra note 55, at 17 (discussing the issues that arise when
ETFs request exemptions from § 17(a)).
137. See, e.g., Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,621 (explaining that the
prospectuses and advertising materials for ETFs prominently disclose that their shares are
not individually redeemable).
138. See WisdomTree Trust, Notice of Application, supra note 1, at 7777 (Complying
with disclosure provisions by stating, “Neither the Trust nor any individual Fund will be
marketed or otherwise held out as an ‘open-end investment company’ or a ‘mutual fund.’
The Prospectus for each Fund will prominently disclose that the Fund is an ‘activelymanaged exchange-traded fund.’”).
139. Reg. of Inv. Companies, supra note 15, § 26.02[1][c].
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acquire individual exemptive orders. 140 The SEC also will entertain
petitions for individual exemptive orders filed by non-transparent actively
managed funds. 141 Section 6(c) of the 1940 Act provides that the SEC
may, either on its own motion or upon application, exempt securities and
transactions from any provision of the Act or any rule established under it,
provided that such exemption be “necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and consistent with the protection of investors . . . .” 142 The SEC
may impose conditions on exemptive relief. 143
Financial innovators welcome the SEC’s proposed streamlining
process, as obtaining individual exemptive orders is not an easy prospect
and forces many ETF sponsors to “innovate at the margins—meaning
within parameters that are close to those previously approved by, or
otherwise apparently acceptable to, [the Division of Investment
Management].” 144 Indeed, securing individual exemptive orders requires
significant time 145 and money, 146 as explained by Barry P. Barbash, a
former Director of the Division of Investment Management:
In my judgment, an indirect and unintended consequence of the
Commission’s recent spate of regulations in the mutual fund area
has been to bog down the efforts of the SEC staff in approving
new investment management products and services. Many of
those products and services raise issues, sometimes of a highly
technical nature, under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
necessitate the obtaining of an exemptive order issued by the
140. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,642 (“Proposed rule 6c-11 would exempt
ETFs from certain provisions of the [Investment Company] Act, permitting them to begin
operating without obtaining an exemptive order from the Commission.”).
141. Id. at 14,624.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2000) provides the following:
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by order
upon application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person,
security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or
transactions, from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors
and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this subchapter.
143. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 82, at 45 (explaining that an ETF’s application for
exemptive relief is subject to comment by the Division of Investment Management, and
depending on the issues raised, other divisions and offices of the SEC); see also 6-83 Sec. L.
Techs. (MB) § 83.07[1][a][i] (2008) (noting that the SEC can impose conditions on an ETF
before providing relief).
144. Fuller, supra note 7, at 92.
145. Id. (“At present, the exemptive process in [the Division of Investment Management]
can take as little as six months for routine index-based ETFs or several years for more novel
ETFs.”).
146. The SEC estimates that it costs about $75,000 to $350,000 for an ETF to submit an
application for exemptive relief. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,646 n.301.
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Commission under section 6(c) of the 1940 Act. Regardless of
whether the product is entirely new to the marketplace or based
on existing products, the process of obtaining an exemptive order
is time-consuming, and can be a significant disincentive to
product development. Obtaining an order relating to a novel
product or service, for example, can take eighteen months or
more. Nothing frustrates my clients, and I submit the clients of
other practitioners, more than the time needed to obtain
exemptive orders. 147
1.

Share Pricing and NAV

One prerequisite to transparent ETF registration has been exemptive
relief from the Investment Company Act’s requirement that shares issued
by registered investment companies must be offered, traded, and redeemed
at NAV. 148 Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act contains this
requirement, and rule 22c-1 promulgates it thereunder. Section 22(d)
restricts the sale of redeemable securities issued by investment companies
to “a current public offering price described in the prospectus,” unless such
securities are sold to or through a principal underwriter for distribution. 149
Similarly, rule 22c-1 limits the sale price of redeemable securities issued by
investment companies to NAV. 150
Rule 2a-4, which governs the
calculation of NAV, requires that “[p]ortfolio securities with respect to
which market quotations are readily available shall be valued at current
market value, and other securities and assets shall be valued at fair value as
determined in good faith by the board of directors of the registered
company.” 151 That market price and NAV are intertwined is not a
controversial proposition, as “[t]he [1940] Act also made net asset value,
based upon the market prices of an investment company’s portfolio
securities, the fundamental valuation criterion of registered investment
companies.” 152
Despite these provisions, the SEC permits ETFs, with shares trading
on secondary markets at “negotiated” prices determined by market forces,

147. Mutual Funds: A Review of the Regulatory Landscape: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 48 (2005) (statement of Barry P. Barbash,
Partner, Shearman & Sterling LLP).
148. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 82, at 43 (“[T]he hybrid nature of ETFs does not fit
neatly into the existing U.S. regulatory regime.”).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (2000).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2008).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2008).
152. Harriman v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 160 (D. Del. 1975).
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to register as investment companies despite § 22(d) and rule 22c-1. 153 An
examination of these provisions’ objectives is key to understanding why
the SEC has been willing to grant ETFs exemptive relief from § 22(d) and
rule 22c-1. 154 Both provisions respond to abuses in the mutual fund
industry; section 22(d) aims to prevent “riskless trading” schemes, 155 while
the “primary purpose” 156 of rule 22c-1 similarly is to prevent dilution-based
abuses related to “backwards pricing.” 157 These regulations particularly
respond to situations where traders, knowing a mutual fund’s closing price
on the current day and its next-day opening price, have purchased shares at
the first price to resell them at a guaranteed higher price the next day. 158
Solomon Freedman, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate
Regulation in 1968, explained how such transactions functioned:
You all remember that the President, during the evening of
March 31 (a Sunday), announced that the bombardment of North
[Vietnam] would be curtailed and that he would not accept
renomination. During the morning of Monday, April 1, the
general market rose sharply—the highest single day increase in
some 4-1/2 years. Some individuals placed large orders for the
purchase of fund shares at about 1:30 p.m. and obtained the 3:30
p.m. price of the previous Friday. In fact, in one no-load fund, a
million dollar purchase was entered—and, about 4:00 p.m. those
shares were ‘redeemed’ upon the basis of the 3:30 p.m. price—
thereby making a very handsome profit. 159
153. See sources cited supra note 134 (explaining the relationship between transactions
in ETF shares, § 22(d), and rule 22c-1).
154. At least with respect to § 22(d), some argue that “there is little legislative history” to
inform how the provision functions. SPA ETF Trust and SPA ETF Inc., Notice of
Application, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,963, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,475, 51,478
(Aug. 31, 2007); see 1 Reg. of Inv. Companies (MB) § 9.03[1] (2008) (noting that § 22(d)
has little legislative history regarding its purpose and an ambiguous administrative history).
155. See, e.g., SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 429 (“Paragraph (d) of
section 22 requires that open-end securities be sold only at the current offering price
described in the prospectus. This subsection, designed at least in part to prevent insider
riskless trading and the resulting dilution, has resulted in a system of retail price
maintenance that fixes open-end share prices and prevents dealers from making a secondary
market.”).
156. Reflow Fund, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1493234 (July 15, 2002).
157. Id.; see Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Paul F. Roye,
Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 13, 2002) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle111302.htm (“The SEC adopted Rule
22c-1 to address its concern that backward pricing could lead to significant dilution of the
investments of existing fund shareholders.”).
158. See, e.g., U.S. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 707 (1975) (explaining
that the “interim period” between the calculation of a fund’s closing price on the previous
day and the next-day opening price based on NAV at the current day’s closing, provided
opportunities to “engage in ‘riskless trading’” by exploiting the price difference).
159. Solomon Freedman, Dir., Div. of Corporate Regulation, SEC, Projections, Forward
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Traders who knew both the current and next-day share price not only
cleansed their transactions of risk, 160 but also watered down the value of
remaining shareholders’ investments where the cash value paid to redeem
shares exceeded the shares’ NAV. 161 Similarly, an investor who bought
shares in a fund could wait until the first price moved higher than the
second, thus indicating that share value was declining. 162 The investor
could wait for the price drop to hit bottom and buy on the next uptick,
thereby diluting the value of the outstanding shares by acquiring more
shares than when the original intent to purchase was formed. 163
ETF shareholders do not face the same threat of dilution that once
plagued the mutual fund industry because ETFs redeem in-kind instead of
exchanging cash for shares. 164 Moreover, deviations from NAV in
secondary market transactions are contained between parties to the
transaction and do not draw down the fund’s assets. 165 Given these barriers
to dilution, a legitimate question is why § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 are relevant
in the ETF context, particularly given that “[t]he SEC’s apparent concern is
primarily with positive distortions of NAV.” 166 Positive distortions of
NAV can be dangerous for investors, and the SEC takes them seriously
because they dilute the wealth of non-redeeming shareholders by drawing
cash out of funds when shares are redeemed. 167 While this threat does not
apply to the in-kind redemption process used by ETFs, § 22(d) and rule
22c-1 remain relevant to a discussion of exemptive relief in the ETF
context, as they may provide inroads into explaining why ETFs are
permitted to function as they do. Alternatively, § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 may

Pricing, and Group Purchasing, Remarks before the 20th Annual International Mutual Fund
Dealers’ Conference 4 (Oct. 22, 1968), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/1968/102268freedman.pdf.
160. See, e.g., id. (discussing unfortunate strategic behavior resulting from the pricing
mechanism).
161. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 707-08 (explaining that the “immediate
appreciation” made possible by backwards pricing “was obtained at the expense of the
existing shareholders, whose equity interests were diluted by a corresponding amount”).
162. Freedman, supra note 159, at 4.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 65, at 349 (“[T]he close correspondence between
NAVs and market prices of US ETFs appears to be due largely to the feature of in-kind
purchases and redemptions, which historically has facilitated price-correcting arbitrage
activity.”).
165. At least one fund company seeking approval of a new ETF has made the argument
that “market trading in [ETF shares] does not involve the [ETF] as parties and cannot result
in dilution of an investment in [the ETF].” SPA ETF Trust, supra note 154, at 51,478.
166. Janet Kiholm Smith et al., The SEC’s ‘Fair Value’ Standard for Mutual Fund
Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Assets (Claremont Economics, Working
Paper No. 2000-39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=249317.
167. See U.S. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 707-08 (1975) (discussing
problems with the pricing system).

116

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

not be relevant to ETF investors who remain invested in a fund, but are
nevertheless important to those who seek to convert shares into cash
through transactions in the secondary market.
Granting ETFs exemptive relief from § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 appears
to be a consequence of the belief that the market will act as a surrogate for
fair-value redemption by supplying retail investors with a value close to the
NAV of the portfolio securities underlying their shares. As a result, the
market protects non-selling ETF shareholders—analogous to the nonredeeming mutual fund shareholders in the dilution example—from
artificially crumbling share values caused by below-NAV sales in the
secondary market. Exemptive relief from § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 for ETFs
is based, in part, on the assumption that the market itself will stand in for
regulation to ensure that trading does not occur at deep discounts to NAV.
While § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 necessarily apply to mutual funds, ETFs
receive exemptions from these regulations precisely because, unlike mutual
funds, they are traded in a market that performs the regulations’ valueprotecting function naturally. Based on its historical treatment of these
provisions, the SEC notes in the March 2008 proposed rules that “[o]ur
orders have provided exemptions from the definition of ‘redeemable
security’ and section 22(d) and rule 22c-1 for ETFs with an arbitrage
mechanism that helps maintain the equilibrium between market price and
NAV.” 168
2.

Lessons from Closed-End Funds

At a recent workshop sponsored by the Investment Company Institute
concerning closed-end funds, Andrew Donohue stressed the importance of
accurate NAV valuations for shares in those funds. 169 In response to the
argument that NAV valuations are less important for closed-end funds,
which are traded at market price rather than redeemed at NAV, Donohue
explained that “closed end fund market prices correlate, at least to some
extent, with closed end funds’ NAVs,” such that NAV can influence
trading prices. 170 Donohue implies that inaccurate NAV calculations could
disrupt efficient trading by transmitting false signals to the market. 171 At
first glance, ETFs, which follow closed-end funds by relying on secondary
168. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,624.
169. Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Luncheon
Address at the 2007 ICI Closed End Fund Workshop (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101107ajd.htm; see Jacquelyn Lumb, Donohue
Outlines Staff Concerns with Closed-End Funds, 2007-198 SEC TODAY, Oct. 15, 2007, at 1
(summarizing Donohue’s remarks about accurate valuation and closed-end funds).
170. Donohue, supra note 169.
171. See id. (concluding that a closed end fund’s NAV must be accurate because “NAVs
can affect the market prices at which closed end fund investors trade shares”).

2008]

ARBITRAGE AND EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS

117

market trading as the de facto liquidation method for the retail investor, 172
appear vulnerable to inaccurate NAV calculations. If erroneous NAV
calculations by a fund alter the market price of closed-end funds, it follows
that inaccurate NAV calculations provided by an ETF could affect the
ETF’s share price. However, such a view is correct only at the skeletal
level, as transparent ETFs offer investors unique, market-based protections.
Specifically, equity index ETFs contain a built-in check on serious or
persistent miscalculations of NAV. Equity Index ETFs create an ideal
arbitrage situation by tracking publicly-available indices and trading in
transparent markets. 173 These ETFs do not simply transmit NAV to the
market; instead, market makers have the necessary information to
determine NAV 174 based on the component securities that the ETF
tracks. 175 When arbitrageurs detect an imbalance between share price and
the NAV of portfolio holdings, they smooth the jagged edges by bringing
the two prices into balance. 176 The same is true for the recently-approved
actively managed ETFs, which provide arbitrageurs with the same
transparency. 177
But, if § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 explicitly intend to protect existing
shareholders in mutual funds from discounted redemptions that deplete

172. The ETF market permits redemption with the fund, but limits redemption to
“authorized participants” with a sufficient block of shares to constitute a creation unit. See
Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to ETFs, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,916, at
51,918 n.14 (Aug. 9, 2002) (“The Commission notes that unlike typical open-end
investment companies, where investors have the right to redeem their fund shares on a daily
basis, investors in ETFs can redeem them in creation unit size aggregations only.”); see also
Reg. of Inv. Companies, supra note 15, § 26.02[1] (explaining that large institutional
investors, arbitrageurs, and other market professionals may acquire shares directly from the
ETF by tendering securities); id. § 26.02[1][a] (“[P]rior to any redemption, the redeeming
shareholder (which is almost always an institution, broker-dealer, arbitrageur or other
market professional) must accumulate enough shares to make up a Creation Unit.”); Trang
Ho, Actively Managed ETFs: The Next Frontier, INVESTORS BUS. DAILY, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com (search “Title” for “The Next Frontier”; then follow article
hyperlink) (quoting Patrick Daugherty as stating that “mutual funds allow redemptions of
even a single share of the fund every day; ETFs do not. You can’t redeem a single share,
but you can redeem a block of shares, called a creation unit. That’s typically a multimillion
dollar amount. So you can redeem it wholesale, but not retail.”).
173. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 105 (linking transparency with arbitrage for active
managers).
174. See id. (explaining that ETFs typically show the value per share of their holdings
every fifteen seconds).
175. See, e.g., Plante Moran Fin. Advisors, supra note 69, at 3 (noting it is easier to
determine on a daily basis the holdings of ETFs rather than mutual funds).
176. See discussion infra, Part III.B.3 (noting arbitrageurs limit chaotic pricing and
correct price discrepancies by responding to new information about NAV and share price
imbalances).
177. See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,620 n.27 (discussing proposed
transparency requirements for streamlined approval of actively managed ETFs).

118

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

fund assets, 178 what do these regulations say about future shareholders who
are immune from redemption-based equity drains until they buy into a
fund? History may provide the best explanation, 179 as shadows of early
Investment Company Act enforcement reveal “spirit of the Act” goals that
have become obscured by the more common justification of preventing the
dilution of existing shareholders’ assets. The repurchase schemes in the
years preceding the enactment of the Investment Company Act are
particularly instructive.
Closed-end funds became dangerous during the 1930’s in part because
the absence of a redemption requirement forced liquidating investors to
seek value in deteriorating secondary markets. Closed-end fund share
values were not only declining, but would also trade below NAV. 180 Such
a result was possible because, “[u]nlike shareholders of open-end funds,
closed-end fund shareholders who sell their stock may receive more or less
than the net asset value of the shares.” 181 One especially troubling effect of
these discounts was the reaction of some closed-end companies facing
powerful incentives 182 to engage in extensive repurchase operations. 183
The repurchase schemes of the 1930’s were possible in large part
because illiquid assets held in closed-end funds 184 were subject to murky
valuations that prevented investors from accurately pricing NAV. Pricing
trouble in the secondary markets particularly damaged investors in closedend funds, and spurred regulation under the Investment Company Act,
based, in part, on the need to “prevent discriminatory repurchases of their
own securities by investment companies whose security holders do not
have the right to require redemption . . . .” 185 The difficulty in valuing
178. See, e.g., Letter from Craig S. Tyle to Paul F. Roye, supra note 157 (stating that the
SEC adopted rule 22c-1 to protect mutual fund shareholders from significant dilution of
their investments).
179. See Harriman v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 159 (D. Del.
1975) (explaining that the Investment Company Act of 1940 was “designed to protect
shareholders of investment companies from a variety of sharp practices that had become
widespread during the 1930’s”); see generally William K. Sjostrom, Tapping the Reservoir:
Mutual Fund Litigation Under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 251, 258 (2005) (summarizing how the Investment Company Act arose from
the historic context of the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent threats to investors).
180. SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 426.
181. Letter from Dixie L. Johnson & John T. Bostelman to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra
note 115, at 82.
182. SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 426.
183. Id.
184. Closed-end funds can invest in illiquid assets because they do not need to meet the
redemption obligations of their open-end counterparts.
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
REGULATION OF SECURITIES, FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 88 (3rd ed. 2006).
185. 86 Cong. Rec. 2844, 2846 (1940) (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1940) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in IV Federal Securities Laws: Legislative History 1933-1982 (BNA)
3827 (1983).
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assets held by closed-end funds allowed for persistent discounts and
prevented an efficient, market-driven price correction, leaving investors
vulnerable to discounted repurchases. As the SEC explained,
After the crash, repurchases often were made for different
reasons. As the price of closed-end shares fell to a discount,
repurchases at discount prices became a source of book profits
for closed-end companies. Many times, however, the profits
were made at the expense of selling shareholders who had no
way of knowing the extent of the discount and, therefore, the
extent to which they were liquidating their shares at prices that
did not reflect their true value. This was possible because closedend companies did not disclose the net asset value of their
shares. 186
While the SEC subsequently enacted § 23 of the Act to regulate
repurchase transactions directly, 187 an important issue that currently
surrounds ETFs is whether and to what extent transparency arms the
market with sufficient information to correct inefficient pricing. Closedend funds still face persistent discounts today, a situation often explained
by the illiquid assets they hold. 188 ETFs have avoided a similar fate
through high liquidity and transparent portfolios that facilitate pricecorrecting arbitrage. 189
While the closed-end fund discount problem affects selling
shareholders, other regulations—especially § 22(d) and rule 22c-1—help
protect shareholders that remain invested in funds by targeting discounted
redemptions. 190 Thus, § 23(c) on the one hand, and § 22(d) and rule 22c-1
on the other, collectively protect two classes of investors. While § 22(d)
and rule 22c-1 protect investors who remain invested in a fund by
preventing cash-based redemptions at prices above NAV from diluting

186. SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 427.
187. See generally id. at 427-28 (discussing § 23 and its mechanism to allow closed-end
investment companies to repurchase their shares from investors on the open market).
188. The small number of hedge funds listed as closed-end funds on exchanges have
proven vulnerable to the same discounting problem common to the closed-end structure.
Brynn D. Peltz & Joseph J. Muscatiello, Hedge Fund Stock Exchange Listings:
Considerations and Developments, 41 REV. OF SECS. & COMMODITIES REG., Feb. 6, 2008, at
25, 28 (“[H]edge funds listed on liquid exchanges as closed-end funds have typically traded
at a discount to net asset value.”).
189. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 91 (explaining that “[arbitrage] keeps an ETF’s shares
from consistently trading at a significant discount to NAV,” unlike many closed-end funds’
shares); see also William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
69, 104 (2008) (“ETFS avoid the perils of unfair valuation by trafficking in publicly traded
investments.”).
190. See discussion supra notes 155, 157 (noting the SEC’s actions to protect existing
mutual fund shareholders from dilution).
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their assets, 191 § 23(c) protects sellers by placing limitations on the
repurchase of closed-end fund shares. 192 Yet, this is only half of the puzzle,
as shares can also trade at a premium to NAV, which benefits the seller at
the buyer’s expense. While this other side of the coin has been addressed
less frequently, 193 at least one account suggests that the SEC may be
concerned with premiums above NAV, albeit in the limited context of an
offering rather than during the course of subsequent trades:
While there are no statutory prohibitions on issuance of shares of
a closed-end company at a price above net asset value during the
course of an offering, the SEC staff has taken no-action positions
on this point. The staff has taken the position that it would not be
consistent with the Investment Company Act for a closed-end
company to offer its common stock to the public at a price that is
significantly in excess of its net asset value. 194
Situating this passage within the context of § 23(c) and the policy
undercurrent of § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 195 suggests a broad approach to
investor protection that spans existing shareholders as well as buyers and
sellers in the secondary market. Protecting buyers and sellers in the
secondary market is a strong consideration for ETFs, as in-kind redemption
precludes the problem of artificially high cash payments that dilute fund
assets. If the SEC finds it desirable to protect buyers and sellers from
premiums or discounts by keeping secondary market prices close to NAV,
an immediate question is why the SEC frequently grants ETFs exemptive
relief from the requirements of § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 to permit trading at
negotiated prices, as these prices are not guaranteed to approximate NAV.
191. Id.; see In the Matter of Heartland Advisors, et al., Order Instituting Administrative
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 8884, Exchange Act Release No.
57,206, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,136 (Jan. 25, 2008), available at 2008
SEC LEXIS 174, at *4 (alleging that certain mutual funds priced municipal bonds “at prices
above their fair values,” such that “the Funds’ Net Asset Values (‘NAVs’) were incorrect,
the Funds’ shares were incorrectly priced, and investors purchased and redeemed Fund
shares at prices that benefited redeeming investors at the expense of remaining and new
investors”).
192. See generally SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 427-28 (discussing the
protections offered by § 23).
193. While there are few specific references to offering an investment company’s
securities to the public at a price above NAV, the SEC is concerned with protecting
potential investment company shareholders. See, e.g., Comment, The Investment Company
Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 446 (1941) (claiming, in regard to the disclosure
requirements of the 1940 Act, that “[a]ll of these disclosure provisions are designed as much
to safeguard the potential purchaser of investment securities as the individual who is already
a stockholder”).
194. PRACTISING LAW INST., FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS § 7:6 (Clifford E.
Kirsch ed., 1999).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 157 (discussing the SEC’s actions to
protect existing mutual fund shareholders from the effects of dilution).
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If investor protection in the course of secondary market transactions is a
valid concern, then the SEC must base exemptive relief from § 22(d) and
rule 22c-1 on the premise that some other element at play reduces the need
for direct regulation.
3.

Arbitrage and Regulation

One explanation for exemptions from § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 is that
transparent ETFs protect retail investors naturally from large premiums and
discounts in the secondary market. 196 Specifically, arbitrageurs limit
chaotic pricing by quickly responding to new information about NAV and
share price imbalances, thus smoothing away pricing discrepancies. The
following account is noteworthy:
A key distinction between ETFs and closed-end investment
companies, however, is the ability to continually purchase and
redeem shares of the ETF at net asset value per share (“NAV”).
This feature is intended to create an arbitrage pricing discipline
which minimizes the occurrence of discount and/or premium
pricing historically experienced by closed-end investment
companies. 197
By “ensur[ing] smooth trading on the stock exchange,” 198 arbitrage
naturally corrects inefficient pricing and indirectly protects retail investors
from the perils of information disparity. Arbitrage—while providing
immediate profits only to institutional investors engaged in direct
transactions with a fund 199 —also keeps prices efficient by leveling price
discrepancies in the secondary market. 200 This leveling process uses the
196. See, e.g., Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57 (arguing that one benefit of ETFs, as
compared to closed-end funds, is that “[c]losed-end fund investors often find their shares
trading at a discount or premium . . . . For ETFs, however, any inconsistency between
trading price and NAV should be slim and short-lived, and perhaps nonexistent once
transaction costs are considered.”).
197. FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 194, § 16-2.
198. Deutsche Börse Group, Opportunities for Institutional Investors 39 (2003),
http://www.eurexchange.com/download/documents/publications/DB_AM_Final.pdf.
199. Arbitrage is conducted almost exclusively by institutional investors. See Reg. of
Inv. Companies, supra note 15, § 26.02[1][a] (“If the ETF’s NAV is higher than the ETF’s
share price on the exchange, institutional investors, broker-dealers and other arbitrageurs or
market professionals will redeem Creation Units for portfolio securities.”); DAVID LOGAN
SCOTT, INVESTING IN MUTUAL FUNDS 139 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2004) (“A disparity
between the value of ETF shares and the underlying basket of securities that represent the
index will result in arbitrage by broker-dealers until the disparity in values is eliminated.”);
Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57 (“The institutional investor (or market specialist) may, at
its discretion, obtain the return of its deposited securities by redeeming with the ETF an
equivalent number of the shares it received originally from the ETF.”).
200. See Bansal & Somani, supra note 29, at 41 (explaining that large investors can
redeem ETF shares of the underlying portfolio and vice versa to take advantage of

122

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

creation and redemption processes to protect the retail investor, even
though retail investors do not participate in creation or redemption. 201
The SEC has explained that closed-end investment companies that
engaged in discounted repurchases reaped profits by exploiting investors’
inability to accurately price the shares they held. 202 Such a scenario does
not threaten investors in index-tracking or newly-approved actively
managed ETFs, 203 as transparency provides the information necessary for
arbitrageurs to control premiums and discounts, and thus reduces the risk
that retail investors will purchase shares above NAV or sell them below
NAV. 204 This is the case even if most investors cannot or do not identify
deviations between share price and NAV. 205 The current arbitrage regime
for transparent ETFs corrects price spreads even if the retail investor is
unaware of a premium or discount and does nothing to protect his or her
investment from it. 206
The SEC has provided ETFs with exemptive relief from § 23(c) and §
22(d) at least in part because arbitrage transactions animate the secondary
market and provide price stability to retail investors. As long as the ETF
market remains transparent, arbitrageurs will possess the necessary
information to capitalize on profit opportunities and thus correct premiums
and discounts, thereby removing the need for direct regulation and
justifying exemptions from the share pricing restrictions of the 1940 Act.
Without tracking published securities indices, transparent actively managed
ETFs are expected, like their predecessors, to “provi[de] institutional

disparities between the market price and the NAV, which in turn keeps the two trading
closely).
201. See Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57 (explaining that the creation and redemption
processes prevent institutional investors from engaging in strategic large-block trading
practices that would harm ordinary investors).
202. SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 427.
203. Although persistent discount problems that have affected some closed-end funds
have not affected ETF investors, ETFs are not entirely safe. There is always a risk that ETF
investors will have difficulty selling shares in a declining market. See Ragozino &
Gambino, supra note 28, at 4 (explaining that, because common investors cannot redeem
ETF shares, “in a rapidly declining market, where both institutional and retail purchasers of
ETFs are likely to be scarce, retail investors may have difficulty selling their ETF shares”).
Nonetheless, while selling ETF shares, like any security, may be difficult in a falling
market, ETFs are unlikely to trade below the NAV of the underlying portfolio securities.
204. See Strauss, supra note 55, at 15 (noting that arbitrage generally has allowed ETFs
to trade at prices materially similar to NAV, in marked contrast to closed-end funds that
frequently trade at discounts to NAV).
205. The arbitrage system adequately protects ETF investors from discounts or
premiums because it naturally corrects price defects without requiring any action by the
average investor. See, e.g., Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57 (“[O]ne advantage of ETFs
is a built-in mechanism to ensure that they are priced according to the market value of the
underlying securities in the fund.”).
206. See id. (explaining that ETFs price near NAV and provide high liquidity).
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investors and other arbitrageurs the information necessary to engage in
ETF share purchases and sales on the secondary market, and purchases and
redemptions with the fund, which should help keep ETF share prices from
trading at a significant discount.” 207 As a result of readily-available data
and the natural profit incentives of arbitrageurs, investors in transparent
ETFs “can feel confident that the shares they’re buying are as close to the
true value of the index as possible.” 208
By granting transparent ETFs exemptive relief from certain provisions
of the 1940 Act, the SEC implicitly recognizes the limits of regulation in
the context of transparent ETFs. In many ways, exemptive relief from the
share pricing provisions of the 1940 Act represents the exclusion of
regulatory intervention where markets naturally correct inefficiencies. By
ceding to natural forces that supplant the need for regulatory intervention,
the SEC may have advanced quietly, or at least deferred to, a normative
constraint on unnecessary market intervention with respect to transparent
ETFs. The remaining issue is whether this constraint will remain viable for
opaque actively managed ETFs, which would aspire to be free from both
index-tracking and full transparency.
This section of the Article has addressed the role of transparency and
NAV valuation as core investor protections in the ETF market. Equity
index ETFs have received exemptive relief from various provisions of the
Investment Company Act because the high levels of transparency
surrounding share prices and NAV convey sufficient information for
arbitrageurs to naturally correct market imbalances by eliminating
premiums and discounts. Furthermore, this section has argued that the SEC
has allowed arbitrage in the ETF market to shape the contours of
regulation. In granting exemptive relief from § 22(d) and rule 22c-1 under
the 1940 Act, the SEC has deferred to arbitrage in the transparent ETF
market as a process of natural correction that controls pricing imbalances
and protects retail investors without the need for direct regulation.
To further situate ETFs within this schema, the next section focuses
on exemptive relief from the requirement that investment companies must
issue redeemable securities. If closed-end funds are problematic because
they force investors to confront risks attendant to difficult valuations by
confining liquidation opportunities to the secondary market, then it is
interesting that modern ETFs, particularly when organized as open-end
investment companies, have been able to limit redemption to creation unit
holders. The next section provides a simple explanation of why this has
been the case.

207. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,623.
208. ARCHIE M. RICHARDS, ALL ABOUT EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 57 (McGraw Hill
2003).
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Redeemable Securities

The limited right of redemption 209 for ETF shareholders is unique
because ETFs are usually registered as open-end investment companies. 210
This is more than a mere structural curiosity because the right of
redemption common to open-end funds “leads to many differences in the
regulatory treatment of open-end and closed-end companies under the
[Investment Company] Act.” 211 While limiting redemption to creation unit
holders 212 is less restrictive than excluding redemption altogether,
comparisons of redemption rights between ETFs and traditional closed-end
funds form the basis for numerous discussions about ETFs’ “hybrid”
structure, 213 which incorporates elements of both the open and closed-end
fund models. A criticism of registering ETFs as open-end investment
companies may have some appeal, given the de facto exclusion of retail
investors from the right of redemption, as “trading ETF shares through a
broker is the only way for small investors to redeem their shares because
they are not financially able to perform . . . ‘in-kind’ transactions.” 214
This limitation raises questions about the justification for providing
open-end ETFs with exemptive relief from § 2(a)(32) and § 5(a)(1) of the
1940 Act. Section 2(a)(32) defines a “redeemable security” as one that
entitles the holder, upon presentment to the fund, to the approximate
proportionate share of the fund’s assets or the cash equivalent represented
by the presented securities. 215 Section 5(a)(1) adds the provision that an
open-end investment company may offer for sale “any redeemable security
of which it is the issuer.” 216 This is an important point because, although
closed-end funds are registered as investment companies, they do not issue
redeemable securities. 217 The distinction between open and closed-end
209. Shareholders may redeem ETF shares only in creation unit aggregations, typically
of at least 50,000 shares. Because individual shares are not redeemable, “there is an issue as
to whether ETFs can be viewed as issuing redeemable securities and therefore entitled to
register as a UIT or as an open-end company.” Strauss, supra note 55, at 16-17; see Laurin
Blumenthal Kleiman, The Nuts and Bolts of Unit Investment Trusts (or Why a UIT is Not a
Mutual Fund), in PRACTISING LAW INST., NUTS & BOLTS OF FIN. PRODUCTS 2005 631, 674
(2005) (“ETFs issue and redeem blocks of shares (typically called ‘creation units’)
consisting of a specific number (e.g., 50,000) of non-redeemable individual shares which, in
turn, trade on an exchange.”).
210. See Letter from Rita Dew to Douglas J. Scheidt, supra note 107 (stating that most
ETFs are open-end registered investment companies).
211. SEC Protecting Investors, supra note 117, at 422.
212. See discussion supra note 209 (citing the need to redeem ETF shares in creation
unit aggregations).
213. Gastineau, supra note 123, at 38.
214. Stout & Chen, supra note 45, at 57.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2000).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (2000).
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funds is based on the type of assets that each holds. Closed-end funds often
invest in illiquid assets and thus make it burdensome and impractical to
cover redemptions. 218 Hence, closed-end funds are not subject to the
liquidity requirements of open-end funds, 219 a feature consistent with the
offering of non-redeemable securities that represent interests in illiquid
assets.
The right of redemption ensures that shares in a fund can be converted
into NAV, even if secondary market prices are significantly discounted, as
often occurs with the shares of closed-end funds. 220 Redemption can also
provide some insurance against low liquidity situations, as shareholders
have a predictable means of converting holdings to cash or securities. In
the ETF market, trading replaces the need for universal redemption
common to most open-end funds because the market naturally protects
value and liquidity. Transparency, coupled with intra-day trading, creates a
situation where shares in ETFs are both highly liquid and, as a result of
arbitrage, trade at or near NAV. 221 Together, these factors create an
instrument with the investor protections common to universally-redeemable
securities, with the added liquidity of intra-day trading absent in mutual
funds. As such, an implied basis for granting ETFs exemptions from the
redemption requirement for open-end investment companies may be that
transparency creates a natural market environment that substantially
approximates the protections of NAV-based redemption. The incentive for
arbitrage profits naturally draws institutional investors into the ETF market
and creates the functional equivalent of a universal right to redeem by
218. See David Jackson, ETF Investing Guide: Why Use Closed-End Funds? SEEKING
ALPHA, July 1, 2006, http://seekingalpha.com/article/15270-etf-investing-guide-why-useclosed-end-funds (noting that closed-end funds, which often invest heavily in illiquid assets,
are better-equipped than open-end funds to buy and sell assets in response to inflows and
outflows of capital); see also MARK J.P. ANSON, HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 37273 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003) (“A close-end fund can also invest
in less liquid assets without the 15% limitation [on illiquid assets] that is imposed on openend funds.”).
219. Mutual funds are subject to significant liquidity requirements:
[A]n open-end mutual fund must offer its shareholders daily liquidity equal to
the cash value of each share’s net asset value. Consequently, the fund’s
manager must adjust her investment strategy to cope with unexpected cash
inflows and outflows. Usually, open-end mutual funds maintain a certain
amount of cash to fund redemptions. Last, an open-end mutual fund cannot
invest more than 15% of its total assets in illiquid investments (i.e., assets that
are not readily marketable within seven days).
ANSON, supra note 218, at 372.
220. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 53 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (describing the perplexity of persistent
discounting in closed-end funds).
221. See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (covering the relationship between arbitrage and
NAV).
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steering trading prices toward NAV. 222
To explain how current ETFs petition for relief from § 2(a)(32) and §
5(a)(1), Paul F. Roye, former Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment
Management, noted that ETF shares “typically trade at or near NAV
because of arbitrage opportunities,” such that investors “generally should
be able to sell their shares in the secondary market for a price at, or near,
NAV—even if they cannot redeem shares directly from the fund.” 223
Secondary market price stability explains why ETFs have not experienced
the problem of persistent discounts that many closed-end funds face. 224
Arbitrage ensures that secondary markets price ETF shares to NAV, such
that the market provides the investor with “approximately his proportionate
share of the issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.” 225
The closeness between share price and NAV ensures that retail investors
not in possession of creation units will nonetheless be protected, 226 as
shares can be sold on secondary exchanges for prices close to the
underlying NAV of an equivalent interest in the ETF’s portfolio.
5.

Transactional Mechanics and Section 17

Exemptive relief from NAV-based transactions and universal
redemption are meaningless unless the SEC also grants exemptions
necessary for a functioning arbitrage system in the ETF market.
Exemptions from § 17(a) of the Investment Company Act have long served
this purpose by accommodating the necessary transactional mechanics for
effective primary and secondary market transactions in ETFs. Section
17(a)(1) places significant restrictions on the ability of an “affiliated person
or promoter of or principal underwriter for a registered investment

222. Fund companies have pushed for SEC approval of new ETFs through arguments
such as the following: “Applicants further state that because the market price of Shares will
be disciplined by arbitrage opportunities, investors should be able to sell Shares in the
secondary market at prices that do not vary substantially from their NAV.” SPA ETF Trust,
supra note 154, at 9.
223. Roye, supra note 41.
224. Some commentators propose that closed-end funds consistently trade at discounts
because redemption is unavailable. See ANSON, supra note 218, at 373 (explaining that
post-IPO discounts in the trading prices of closed-end funds may be caused by “the inability
to tender shares back to the mutual fund issuer”).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (2000).
226. See Letter from Anthony Dudzinski, Chief Executive Officer, Xshares Advisors
LLC, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 20, 2008) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-08/s70708-15.pdf (“We believe that transparency and
disclosure are the keys to effective arbitrage that benefits all fund shareholders. An
effective arbitrage leads to lower spreads and more efficient trading, effectively lowering
costs to shareholders.”).

2008]

ARBITRAGE AND EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS

127

company” 227 to sell or purchase securities in the company or in an entity
“controlled” 228 by the company. Section 12(d)(1) is a related provision that
governs one registered investment company’s ability to obtain shares or
voting rights in another. 229
Section 2(a)(3)(A) defines an “affiliated person” as “any person
directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5
per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities” 230 of an
investment company. 231 Section (2)(a)(9) defines “control” as ownership
of twenty-five percent of an investment company’s outstanding voting
securities either directly or through ownership of a controlled company. 232
This definition can bring transactions under the purview of § 17, or, if the
entities at issue are registered investment companies, under that of § 12(d).
Without exemptive relief, § 17 in particular could pose a threat to
arbitrage transactions in the ETF market, because purchases and
redemptions of creation units could create new “affiliated” persons in those
who acquire a sufficient percentage of securities, thus prohibiting
transactions found to constitute “sales” under the Act. 233 The risk of a
violation is centered on primary market transactions, as § 17(a)(1) governs
sales of securities “to” registered investment companies or their controlled
entities. 234 Section 17(a)(2) bars purchases by affiliated purchasers “from”
registered investment companies. 235 Most secondary market transactions,
which do not involve issuing companies as parties, are not problematic
under § 17. 236 Nonetheless, for ETFs to function, the SEC must permit
227. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (2000).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1) (2000).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1) (2000).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (2000).
231. Section 2(a)(3)(A) uses the term “person.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (2000).
Section 2(a)(3)(E) makes the appropriate connection by applying the restriction as follows:
“[I]f such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any
member of an advisory board thereof” is bound by the limitations of §17(a). 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(a)(3)(E) (2000).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (2000).
233. See Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,621 (“Section 17(a) of the Act
generally prohibits an affiliated person of a registered investment company, or an affiliated
person of such person, from selling any security to or purchasing any security from the
company. Because purchases and redemptions of Creation Units may be in-kind rather than
cash transactions, section 17(a) may prohibit affiliated persons of an ETF from purchasing
or redeeming Creation Units.”); 1 Reg. of Inv. Companies (MB) § 8.01[1][a][ii] (2008)
(“Although arguably permitted by Sections 2(a)(32) and 17(a)(1) of the Act, in the past the
SEC has required exemptive relief for affiliates to redeem fund shares on an ‘in kind’ basis
(i.e., the distribution of portfolio holdings) because such a transaction may constitute a
purchase of securities from the fund prohibited by Section 17(a)(2).”) (emphasis added).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1) (2000).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(2) (2000).
236. See BLDRS Index Funds Trust, et al., Notice of Application, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,386, 69 Fed. Reg. 54, at 13,074 (Mar. 15, 2004) (explaining the caveats
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“affiliated persons” to engage in direct transactions with ETFs organized as
investment companies, 237 and in particular must permit “affiliated persons”
to deposit securities into an ETF and to receive portfolio securities from the
ETF. 238
In March 2008, the SEC proposed exemptions for transparent ETFs
from § 17(a)(1), § 17(a)(2), and § 12(d)(1). 239 This is especially
noteworthy because the transactions that these provisions otherwise
prohibit are precisely the transactions necessary for a functioning arbitrage
mechanism. The SEC previously granted relief from § 17 if several criteria
are satisfied, including that “the redemption in kind is effected at
approximately the affiliated shareholder’s proportionate share of the
distributing fund’s current net assets,” 240 and that “the securities distributed
in-kind are valued in the same manner as they would be for calculating the
fund’s NAV.” 241 In light of the purpose of § 17 as a means “to prevent
insiders from using an investment company to benefit themselves to the
detriment of the company and its shareholders,” 242 it follows that the SEC
will permit only those affiliate transactions that are based on NAV, thus
preventing affiliates from receiving favorable treatment at the expense of
fund shareholders. This approach places ETFs comfortably within the
historic context of regulation under the Investment Company Act, as the
SEC “has consistently utilized net asset value as the controlling factor in
section 17 proceedings.” 243 The SEC advanced a similar justification in
support of the March 2008 proposed exemptions from § 17(a)(1), §
17(a)(2), and § 12(d)(1). 244
It may be an oversimplification, however, to limit the justification for
relief from § 17 and § 12(d)(1) to the assurance of a practical check on
overreaching affiliates. A less articulated, but additional explanation for

of § 17).
237. See id. (describing the need for such an exception).
238. See Moriarty, supra note 82 (noting that ETFs have needed to secure exemptive
relief from the Invesment Company Act with respect to “Sections 17(a) and 17(b) to permit
affiliates to deposit securities into, and receive Portfolio Securities from, the ETF”).
239. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,640.
240. Signature Financial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
981, at *17 (Dec. 28, 1999) (listing requirements for relief from an enforcement action
under § 17(a)).
241. Reg. of Inv. Companies, supra note 233, § 8.01[1][a][ii].
242. Id. § 8.01.
243. Harriman v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 160 (D. Del.
1975).
244. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,640 (noting, in regard to the proposed
exemption from § 12(d)(1), that “[p]ermitting an acquiring fund to purchase additional ETF
shares from the ETF at NAV on the same basis as any other purchaser of a creation unit, by
itself, seems to provide little opportunity for the acquiring fund to manage the ETF for its
own benefit”).
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the granting of relief from § 17 in particular is that ETF transactions
between investment companies and affiliates may be necessary to protect
the investments of non-affiliate shareholders, by ensuring that such
shareholders may convert shares into the cash equivalent of NAV. In other
words, there is a need to protect retail investors who are unable to acquire
enough shares to form creation units, and thus lack the market power to
temper ETF share prices in light of the underlying portfolio securities’
actual value. 245 This need collides with the reality that arbitrage through
strategic creation and redemption remains essential to quickly level share
discounts and premiums. The only actors with the institutional competence
to perform this task are large investors who, absent exemptive relief, might
become “affiliated” with an ETF when transacting in creation units. 246
Put another way, “[d]esignated Sponsors of ETFs are the crucial link
between the primary and secondary markets. Besides being market
makers, Designated Sponsors create and redeem ETF shares in the socalled ‘creation/redemption process.’” 247 As such, primary market actors
are the entities that participate in creations and redemptions, 248 which are
the very transactions necessary for a functioning arbitrage regime. 249
Arbitrage, in turn, controls premiums and discounts to ensure that retail
investors can expect trades to occur at or near NAV. 250 Hence, it is likely
that part of the motivation 251 for granting ETFs exemptive relief from § 17

245. See, e.g., Michael Sackheim et al., DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund: An
Innovative Exchange-Traded Fund, FUTURES INDUSTRY, May/June 2006, at 24 (“As with
other ETFs, baskets of shares [in a particular commodity ETF] may be created or redeemed
on any business day but only in integral multiples of 200,000 shares and only by certain
qualified financial institutions called ‘authorized participants.’”).
246. JIM WIANDT & WILL MCCLATCHY, EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 87 (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 2002); see supra text accompanying note 59 (discussing creation units in the
“primary” ETF market).
247. Deutsche Börse Group, supra note 198, at 39 (emphasis added).
248. See, e.g., Demaine, supra note 71, at 357 (“The primary marketplace is the realm of
the large securities dealers whose index basket trades can be made on a large scale at low
cost.”).
249. See Deutsche Börse Group, supra note 198, at 40 (explaining that “arbitrage
opportunities exist” because of “high transparency and the creation/redemption process”).
250. See RICHARDS, supra note 208, at 57 (explaining how arbitrage diminishes price
variance between ETF shares and their underlying portfolio securities).
251. Of course, transparency serves as a primary check on the abuses that the rules
governing affiliates intend to prevent. One commentator explains as follows:
[T]he highly transparent nature of ETFs should operate to reduce, if not
minimize, the risk that any Authorized Participant, whether affiliated or not
with the ETF’s adviser, would be in a position to manipulate either the contents
of the purchase and redemption baskets or the pricing of ETF securities. Any
such manipulation would be reflected in the ETF’s portfolio holdings and NAV
and would be readily transparent to other market participants.
Letter from Philippe El-Asmar to Nancy M. Morris, supra note 59, at 5.
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is that such exemptions are necessary for the arbitrage system to function.
Otherwise, the nature of creation units as large aggregations of shares
would place an inherent regulatory hurdle in front of direct transactions
between affiliated persons and ETFs. If rules governing affiliates constrain
institutional investors’ ability to engage in creation or redemption, they
could seriously compromise the arbitrage mechanism. 252 Were this to
occur, retail investors would be vulnerable to pricing inefficiencies, as the
resulting constraints on arbitrage would remove the assurance that share
prices and NAV remain similar. Exemptive relief from § 17 recognizes
that transactional flexibility for institutional investors may be necessary to
protect the retail investor. 253
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES OF REDUCED TRANSPARENCY
The SEC frequently has granted exemptive relief from various
provisions of the Investment Company Act to equity index ETFs, which
offer a high degree of transparency as the foundation for a price-correcting
arbitrage system. The SEC’s recent approval of fully transparent actively
managed ETFs comports with its treatment of index-tracking funds, as the
new structures also provide the necessary information for stabilizing
arbitrage. 254 However, transparent structures may not represent the full
potential of actively managed ETFs. Speculation about future SEC
approval of opaque ETF structures began almost immediately after the SEC
provided a green light for the first transparent actively managed ETFs. 255

252. Exemptive relief that permits affiliates to transact with ETFs “is potentially
beneficial to fund investors by increasing competition at the Authorized Participant (“AP”)
level which, in turn, would theoretically increase the efficiency of the arbitrage
mechanism.” Letter from Anthony Dudzinski to Nancy Morris, supra note 226, at 9.
253. The SEC recently granted relief from § 17(a)(2) to permit a fund affiliate to
purchase securities from an investment company. The following account explains the basis
of the decision: “The staff agreed with the parties’ assessment that this purchase transaction
[while normally barred by the Act] would nevertheless be in the best interests of the fund’s
shareholders.” Affiliate May Purchase Securities from Fund, 2310 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
6 (Jan. 16, 2008).
254. Issuers devoted substantial attention to the feasibility of an arbitrage regime in
seeking approval for transparent actively managed ETFs. See, e.g., WisdomTree Trust,
Notice of Application, supra note 1, at 7777 (“Applicants expect that the price at which the
Shares trade will be disciplined by arbitrage opportunities created by the ability to
continually purchase or redeem Creation Units at their NAV, which should ensure that the
Shares will not trade at a material discount or premium in relation to their NAV.”); see also
id. at 7778 (“[A]pplicants contend that the proposed distribution system will be orderly
because arbitrage activity will ensure that the difference between the market price of Shares
and their NAV remains narrow.”).
255. See, e.g., Press Release, Foley & Lardner, supra note 10 (quoting George Simon, a
senior member of Foley & Lardner LLP’s team in charge of designing one such fund: “All
of the products being processed now are fully transparent, but we have no doubt that the
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Such speculation is consistent with the current regulatory climate,
particularly in light of the SEC’s comment that, “[b]y proposing this rule
we are not, however, suggesting that we will not consider applications for
exemptive orders for actively managed ETFs that do not satisfy the
proposed rule’s transparency requirements.” 256 Donohue added that
“[p]ermitting most ETFs to come directly to market without the cost and
delay of obtaining an exemptive order would also allow staff to focus on
more novel and difficult requests.” 257 Despite the potential implications of
these statements, actively managed ETFs with reduced transparency will
remain distant for some time. Recent approvals notwithstanding, financial
innovation and regulatory scrutiny remain combatants, and actively
managed ETFs will face more difficult regulatory challenges than their
index-tracking counterparts, especially those that intend to operate with
reduced transparency. 258 While the SEC did not foreclose the possibility of
granting individual exemptive orders for actively managed ETFs with
reduced transparency, such an event would represent a significant departure
from all previous SEC approvals.
Of course, history has already been rewritten in part, as a onceparalyzing concern surrounding the registration of actively managed ETFs
has been resolved:
The feasibility of actively managed ETFs has been the subject of
much debate. A key concern in this regard is the extent to which
the arbitrage process, which keeps market prices in line with
NAV, can effectively function without a fully transparent
portfolio. Absent real time disclosure of the composition of the
underlying portfolio, an arbitrageur will be hindered in its ability
to compare intraday NAV and market prices and to evaluate the
risk/rewards of an arbitrage transaction. 259
SEC will move to less transparent funds next.”).
256. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,623.
257. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Streamline ETF
Approval
Process
(Mar.
4,
2008)
(on
file
with
author),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-30.htm (quoting Andrew J. Donohue, Director of
the SEC’s Division of Investment Management).
258. The words of former SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins are telling:
The [ETF] proposal does not include all actively-managed ETFs—only those
with full transparency. Are there ways to expand the scope of the proposal?
The intent is to consider broadening the rule as we see more actively managed
ETFs. But, we have seen how tortuous it seems to be to adopt rules or rule
changes—witness the soft-dollar issue for the buy-side, e-mail retention, BDC
reform, and changes to Form ADV.
Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Investment
Company Institute’s 2008 Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference 6 (Mar.
17, 2008), http://sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch031708psa.htm.
259. FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 194, §§ 16-5, 16-17.
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Indeed, the SEC has limited its recent approval of actively managed
ETFs to those funds that, like the equity index variety, provide a “unique
arbitrage mechanism that is fueled by full portfolio transparency.” 260 In
addressing its 2001 concept release on actively managed ETFs, the SEC
notes that it was “concerned that reduced transparency could expose
arbitrageurs to greater investment risk and result in a less efficient arbitrage
mechanism, which in turn could lead to more significant premiums and
discounts than experienced by index-based ETFs.” 261 The SEC alleviated
this concern not through an innovative new disclosure regime, but by
simply requiring that actively managed ETFs retain full transparency. 262 In
this way, any new era of the ETF market may provide enhanced structural
freedom, but will not significantly deviate from traditional foundations.
For the near future, actively managed ETFs are likely to remain in the
family of transparent funds that includes the equity index structure. 263 A
transition away from transparency would require convincing the SEC that
opaque actively managed ETFs—through either internal structural design
or natural market forces—somehow can replicate the investor protections
that existing ETFs offer. While such an outcome is possible, the length of
time between SEC approval of equity index and actively managed ETFs, as
well as the SEC’s consistent emphasis on transparency, suggests that nontransparent ETFs will face especially difficult regulatory challenges.
Rather than representing a new structure within an overarching framework
of transparency, opaque actively managed ETFs would step beyond the
framework entirely. The SEC has granted existing ETFs exemptive relief
from various requirements of the Investment Company Act because the
market has sufficient information to naturally correct dangerous price
imbalances through arbitrage. While there will likely be plenty of
innovation directed toward overcoming regulatory concern, 264 it remains
260. Stacy L. Fuller & Richard M. Phillips, SEC Green-Lights First Actively Managed
ETFs, K&L Gates Newsstand (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.klgates.com (search “green
light”; then follow article hyperlink).
261. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 14,622.
262. See, e.g., Judith Burns, SEC Proposes Faster ETF Path to Market, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 2008, at C13 (“Actively managed ETFs that don’t provide daily information about
their portfolio holdings wouldn’t be covered by the SEC’s proposal. SEC investment
management director Andrew Donohue said the agency has yet to make any decisions on
how to handle ETFs whose holdings aren’t fully transparent and omitted them from the
proposal.”).
263. Although significant, the advent of actively managed ETFs does not represent a
radical break with the past, as “actively managed features of ETFs have been, and are likely
to continue to be, developed in connection with, and based on features of, index-based
ETFs.”. Fuller, supra note 7, at 92.
264. See Birdthistle, supra note 189, at 110 (“The existing pattern of ETF growth, when
combined with the possibility of successfully gaining entrance to retirement accounts and
the market for active management, suggests that the ETF industry will continue its
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unclear how less transparent ETFs will fare before regulators.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that multiple grounds may justify exemptive
relief from various provisions of the Investment Company Act, but a strong
consideration is that arbitrage transactions can protect the retail investor
naturally, by exploiting profit opportunities created when the share price of
an ETF and the NAV of its underlying portfolio securities are mismatched.
As the SEC stated in its 2001 concept release on actively managed ETFs,
“[b]ecause of arbitrage opportunities inherent in the ETF structure, ETF
shares generally have not traded in the secondary market at a significant
premium or discount in relation to NAV.” 265 Survival prospects for this
mechanism of natural correction require “constant price discovery in the
public securities market,” 266 which provides arbitrageurs with the necessary
information to perform their stabilizing function. Indeed, the SEC has
recognized that “[t]his high degree of transparency in the investment
operations of an ETF helps arbitrageurs determine whether to purchase or
redeem Creation Units.” 267 While the exemption process for transparent
structures has been crucial to the ETF industry, perhaps its broader
importance lies in what the process reveals about the SEC and its role in
financial markets.
A common theme emerging from the various
exemptions discussed in this Article is that the SEC—at least in the ETF
context—has not over-protected investors by implanting regulatory
restraints where the market does not require them. The subtext of the
explicit justifications in support of exemptive relief from the Investment
Company Act seems to be that regulatory intervention simply is
unnecessary where the market naturally creates that which regulators could
impose. An arbitrage profit potential, made possible through free-flowing
information, has built a self-correcting market for transparent ETFs.
Exemptive relief for these products represents an area where market forces

breakneck expansion.”); Fuller, supra note 7, at 95 (stating that, after SEC approval of the
first actively managed ETFs, “there are powerful incentives at work in the ETF space that
make continued innovation likely”); Letter from David B. Smith, Executive Vice-President,
Mutual Fund Dirs. Forum, to Nancy Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n (May 21,
2008) (on file with author) (“[U]ltimate adoption of [the Proposed Rules] should not be the
endpoint of innovation with respect to exchange-traded products. While the proposal
provides a template for many standard types of ETFs, it certainly does not exhaust the range
of potentially beneficial products that could be offered.”).
265. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,616.
266. Letter from R. Sheldon Johnson, Managing Dir., Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 3, 2002) (on file with author),
http://sec.gov/rules/concept/s72001/johnson1.htm.
267. Actively Managed ETFs, supra note 56, at 57,619.
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receive substantial deference. The issue of whether this deference can
survive the emergence of less transparent or opaque ETF structures will
define future battles between financial innovation and regulatory oversight.

